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Abstract
There are various well-known paradoxes of modal recombination. This paper offers a
solution to a variety of such paradoxes in the form of a new conception of metaphys-
ical modality. On the proposed conception, metaphysical modality exhibits a type of
indefinite extensibility. Indeed, for any objective modality there will always be some
further, broader objective modality; in other terms, modal space will always be open
to expansion.
Keywords Metaphysical necessity · Indefinite extensibility · Bimodal logic
Call a modality objective when it is non-epistemic, non-deontic, non-linguistic, and
non-intentional. The objective modalities are roughly the modalities expressed by
circumstantial modal terms.1 We routinely use such terms in natural language to
express various practical modalities, and, on occasion, nomological modality. Yet,
although uncommon in natural language, circumstantial modal auxiliary verbs like
‘must’ can be used unrestrictedly, that is without restriction to any set of circum-
stances; on this reading, ‘it must be that φ’ is true when φ is the case whatever the
circumstances. When read as such, the objective modality expressed by the modal
is metaphysical modality. Metaphysical modality is accordingly the maximal objec-
tive modality: possibility according to any objective modality entails possibility
according to metaphysical modality.2
1The term ‘objective modality’ was introduced in the relevant sense by Williamson [28], who connects it
to Angelika Kratzer’s [12, chap. 2] notion of a circumstantial modal expression. A rough test for whether
a modal term is circumstantial is whether it is sensitive to the mode under which a proposition in its scope
is presented.
2Some philosophers might be tempted by the idea that metaphysical modality is in some sense a restriction
of logical modality. This is compatible with the claim that metaphysical modality is the maximal objective
modality, for logical modality is a linguistic modality and thus not objective in the relevant sense.
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The idea that metaphysical modality is the maximal objective modality is
widespread. It is frequently assumed in philosophical discussion and regularly
appealed to in explanations of the nature of metaphysical necessity. It reflects the
popular thought that metaphysical modality in some sense concerns all possible
worlds. Nevertheless, this paper argues for a new conception of metaphysical modal-
ity according to which there is one sense in which this maximality thesis is false.
According to the proposed conception, for any objective modality there will always
be some further, broader objective modality; or, in other terms, metaphysical modal
space will always be open to expansion.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Sections 1 and 2 present a modal recom-
binatorial paradox due to Kit Fine [4, pp. 223–224], later reformulated by Peter Fritz
[8].3 Section 3 outlines the parallels which this recombinatorial paradox bears to
the paradoxes of set theory, and suggests a treatment of the former similar to extant
treatments of the latter. Using the resources of a novel bimodal logic, Section 4 devel-
ops the suggested treatment and its revisionary modal metaphysic. Sections 5 and
6 respectively discuss objections to and further applications of the newly developed
metaphysics of modality.
1 Recombination and Paradox
Consider the property of being an elementary particle. This property is intrinsic and
therefore it can be possessed independently of whether it is possessed by any other
individuals. As a result, the following modal recombinatorial principle will be true
(where the operative modality is metaphysical modality):
(R1) For any possible worldw, there is a possible world uwhere all elementary par-
ticles at w are elementary particles and there is an elementary particle distinct
from every elementary particle at w.
(R1) is plausible because in denying it one objectionably places arbitrary limits on
the extent of modal space. Given the purported utterly liberal character of metaphys-
ical modality, for every world w there should be some possible world u where all
elementary particles at w are all elementary particles, and there is some elementary
particle distinct from every elementary particle at w. After all, could not all elemen-
tary particles atw not be elementary particles with some distinct elementary particle?
If w contains no elementary particles, surely it is metaphysically possible that there
be elementary particles. If w contains one or more elementary particles, surely it is
metaphysically possible that there be all of them plus a duplicate of one of them.
Now consider another plausible recombinatorial principle:
(R2) There is some possible world w such that for all possible worlds u all
elementary particles at u are elementary particles at w.
3Strictly speaking, Fine and Fritz’s paradoxes are closely related but not one and the same; Fine’s puzzle
involves classes of possibilia, whereas Fritz’s puzzle involves no such resources.
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(R2) articulates the idea that there is a possibility in which all elementary parti-
cles across modal space are elementary particles. It too is motivated by an aversion
to imposing arbitrariness onto modal space. Since something’s being an elementary
particle is compossible with some other thing’s also being an elementary particle,
there appears to be no limit as to which possible elementary particles are compossi-
ble. Again, given the purported utterly liberal character of metaphysical modality, it
should not be the case that, for example, it is possible that all elementary particles
across modal space except one are elementary particles, yet not possible that all ele-
mentary particles across modal space are elementary particles. To admit that type of
division would be to admit a type of objectionable arbitrariness which a theory of
metaphysical modality theory ought to eschew.4
However, despite (R1) and (R2) both being plausible modal recombinatorial prin-
ciples, Kit Fine [4, pp. 223–224] presents an argument that similar such principles
together lead to paradox. To adapt Fine’s argument, consider w in (R2). From (R1)
we can infer that:
(C) There is a possible world u where all elementary particles at w are elementary
particles and there is also a elementary particle which is not identical with any
of them.
But all the elementary particles at w are all the elementary particles at all worlds.
Contradiction. As a result, (R1) and (R2) cannot be satisfied by a single modality,
for no one modality can possesses this extreme degree of recombinatorial liberality,
including metaphysical modality.
2 Reformulation
The above formulation of the paradox employed first-order quantification over possi-
ble worlds and possibilia. But one should not assume that the paradox is generated by
an extensional reduction of modal notions. Indeed, Peter Fritz [8] has recently shown
how to formalise (R1), (R2), and (C) in the language of pure quantified modal logic,
which avoids first-order quantification over worlds and possibilia. This should dispel
any concern that the paradox is an artefact of reductionism about modal notions.
For a quantified modal language to have the expressive capacity required to for-
mulate the principles, it must be capable of simulating first-order quantification over
possible worlds and possibilia, and simulating cross-reference to worlds over which
one has previously ‘considered’. This expressive requirement is met by enriching the
vocabulary of a conventional quantified modal language with infinitely many distinct
pairs of indexed Vlach-operators (↑n,↓n, for every natural number n)—operators
4Following David Lewis’s [13, pp. 101–104] discussion, advocates of concrete modal realism might reject
(R2) on the basis that some, perhaps large infinite cardinal is an upper bound on the possible size of
spacetime. (In his discussion, Lewis is aware that this would still involve some degree of arbitrariness; see
Lewis (ibid., p.103) in particular.) But this response does not seem to address the core concern, for it is
surely metaphysically possible that elementary particles can be colocated, just as some philosophers, such
as Hawthorne and Uzquiano [10, p. 55], have claimed bosons can actually be.
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that allow one to ‘store’ a world at a place on a list, and at a later point ‘retrieve’ that
world as the world of evaluation. Specifically, ↑n stores the current world of eval-
uation at the nth place on a list, and ↓n places the world stored at the nth place on
the list as the world of evaluation. To give an example of how the operators work,
consider the following formula:
(1) ♦ ↑1 "∀x(F (x)→↓1 G(x))
This can be read in extensional parlance as the claim that there is some possibility at
which every F in any possible world is a G.
To be more precise, the exact vocabulary of the quantified modal language (=L1)
in which we shall work consists of countably many individual variables (x1, x2, ...),
countably many predicate letters (E,F,G...), ¬ (negation) and → (material condi-
tional) as the only truth-functional connectives, ∀ (universal quantification) as the
sole quantifier, and the modal operators " (necessity), ↑n and ↓n for every nat-
ural number n. The existential quantifier ∃ and possibility operator ♦ are used as
abbreviations for ¬∀¬ and ¬"¬, respectively.
Following Kit Fine’s [3, pp. 135–136] early work, Fabrice Correia [1] has shown
how to provide a model-theoretic semantics for languages likeL1. We follow his lead.
Thus a frame F is an ordered pair ⟨W,D⟩, whereW is a non-empty set understood
as a non-empty set of worlds, and D is a function taking each w ∈ W into a non-
empty set Dw, understood as that world’s domain.5 A modelM of L1 based on F =
⟨W,D⟩ is a triple ⟨W,D,V⟩, where V is a function taking any individual constant
of the language into a member of ∪w∈WDw, and any n-place predicate letter of the
language and world into a set of n-tuples of ∪w∈WDw, that predicate’s extension at
that world. Given a model, an assignment is a function g mapping each individual
variable of the language to a member of ∪w∈WDw. Where x is an individual variable,
two assignments g and g′ are x-alternatives iff g and g′ assign the same values for all
variables, except possibly x.
For a set S, let S<ω be the set of ω-sequences of members of S. For seq ∈ S<ω
and s ∈ S, seqn→s is the sequence obtained from replacing the nth item in seq with
s, and seq(n) is the nth item in seq.
We define ‘(M, seq,w) |=g A’ forM = ⟨W,D,V⟩, seq ∈ W<ω, w ∈ W , g an
assignment to the variables inM, and A an formula of the language, recursively as
follows (Vg(a) is used for g(a) if a is an individual variable and for V(a) if a is an
individual constant):
(M, seq,w) |=g Fa1... an iff ⟨Vg(a1), ...,Vg(an)⟩ ∈ V(F,w);
(M, seq,w) |=g ¬A iff (M, seq,w) ̸|=g A;
(M, seq,w) |=g A→ B iff either (M, seq,w) ̸|=g A or (M, seq,w) |=g B;
(M, seq,w) |=g ∀xA iff (M, seq,w) |=g′ A for every x-alternative g′ of g such
that g′(x) ∈ Dw;
5Since frames contain no accessibility relations, the model theory validates an S5 logic for metaphysical
necessity, i.e. ". This is a harmless simplifying assumption, and could be dropped for current pur-
poses. (For example, as Fritz [8, Appendix C] notes, the inconsistency remains even if the 4 axiom for
metaphysical necessity is rejected.)
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(M, seq,w) |=g "A iff for every w′ ∈W , (M, seq,w′) |=g A;
(M, seq,w) |=g ↑n A iff (M, seqn→w,w) |=g A;
(M, seq,w) |=g ↓n A iff (M, seq, seq(n)) |=g A.
A formula A is true at ⟨seq,w⟩ for seq ∈ W<ω and w ∈ W iff for all variable
assignments g, (M, seq,w) |=g A. A formula A of L1 is true in an L1 model
M = ⟨W,D,V⟩ iff it is true at ⟨seq,w⟩, for every seq ∈ W<ω, and every w ∈ W .
A formula A of L1 is valid iff it is true in every L1 model. A set # of L1 formulas
entails an L1 formula A iff for every L1 modelM = ⟨W,D,V⟩, every seq ∈W<ω,
w ∈W , and every variable assignment g, if (M, seq,w) |=g γ for each γ ∈ #, then
(M, seq,w) |=g A. For convenience, we shall talk of some L1 formulas (as opposed
to their set) entailing another L1 formula.
As Fritz [8] shows, we can use the above apparatus to formalise (R1), (R2), and
(C) in the enriched modal language L1, thus avoiding first-order quantification over
worlds. Letting ‘E’ denote the property of being an elementary particle, we write:
(R1*) " ↑1 ♦ ↑2 (↓1 ∀x(E(x)→↓2 E(x)) ∧ ∃x(E(x)∧ ↓1 ¬E(x)))
(R2*) ♦ ↑1 "∀x(E(x)→↓1 E(x))
Yet (R1*) entails that" ↑1 ♦ ↑2 ∃x(E(x)∧ ↓1 ¬E(x))—informally, this is because
both conjuncts of a necessarily possibly true conjunction are necessarily possible.
Since ↑2 is redundant in this formula it simplifies as follows:
(C*) " ↑1 ♦∃x(E(x)∧ ↓1 ¬E(x))
Yet this is not satisfiable with (R2*), in the sense that it cannot be true in any L1
model in which (R2*) is.
Accordingly, the paradox can be formulated in an appropriately expressive quan-
tified modal language. Thus (R1)/(R1*) and (R2)/(R2*) cannot both be licensed by
a single notion of metaphysical necessity. But the grounds for accepting either prin-
ciple are essentially the same: both principles are motivated by the fact that rejecting
them would be to admit extreme arbitrariness into modal space, hence there is no rea-
son why we should reject one over the other. Moreover, flat-footedly rejecting both
seems gratuitous.
What, then, should one conclude from the paradox? Fine [4, p. 224] entertains the
idea of rejecting (R2)/(R2*) by imposing a set-theoretic limitation of size constraint
on the domains of possible worlds. But since we need not understand the domains of
worlds set-theoretically, this constraint is difficult to motivate once again for reasons
of arbitrariness. For why would it not be possible that there are more than set many
things? Moreover, Fine’s proposal is not obviously well-motivated for modal prim-
itivists who reject an extensional reduction of modal discourse to possible worlds
talk. In contrast to Fine, Fritz is more pessimistic; he [8, p. 8] takes the “puzzle [to]
at least chip away at the support for the assumption that the notion of metaphysi-
cal modality is in good standing”, for the assumption that “we have succeeded in
singling out a particular notion of metaphysical necessity” is mostly “a dogma of cur-
rent metaphysics which is supported by the hope that some core theoretical roles of
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metaphysical necessity [e.g. recombinatorial principles] suffice pick out a particular
distinguished modality.”6
In what follows, however, it is argued that the prospects are not so bleak for advo-
cates of metaphysical modality. Instead, a novel conception of metaphysical modality
is offered which does justice to the theoretical reasons motivating (R1)/(R1*) and
(R2)/(R2*) without lapsing into paradox.
3 Modal Expansionism
3.1 Indefinite Extensibility
As a crude gloss, a linguistic expression is indefinitely extensible when given all of
its instances one can define, by sole reference to those instances, a new instance of
the expression that is not included in the collection of the expression’s instances from
which it was defined.7 Roughly speaking, the idea is that such expressions exhibit
a distinctive kind of open-endedness insofar as one can indefinitely expand their
domain. As Russell [19, p. 36] explains an early form of the idea:
[T]here are what we may call self-reproductive processes and classes. That is,
there are some properties such that, given any class of terms all having such a
property, we can always define a new term also having the property in question.
Hence we can never collect all the terms having the said property into a whole;
because, whenever we hope we have them all, the collection which we have
immediately proceeds to generate a new term also having the said property.
The notion of indefinite extensibility is familiar to philosophical discussions of iter-
ative set theory. On the iterative conception of set, from a given universe of sets
one can define, by sole reference to the sets in that universe, a new set which is not
amongst the sets from which it was defined. For instance, take any universe V of sets.
One can define a set which does not belong to V—namely, the set of of all non-self
membered sets in V , for on pain of Russell’s paradox it cannot belong to V .
Following Linnebo [14, pp. 146–147], we can state this idea more precisely. Thus,
consider the following comprehension schema of plural logic:8
Plural Comprehension ∃xx∀u(u ≺ xx ↔ φ(u))
The schema seems uncontroversial: for a condition φ, of course there are the things
that φ. Yet despite its seeming innocence, from Plural Comprehension one can
derive a contradiction with the following unrestricted principle of set formation:
6Fritz [8, pp. 10–11] later considers but does not endorse a solution similar to the one proposed in this
paper. Rayo (MS) also develops this idea in an interestingly different way.
7See Gabriel Uzquiano [25, p. 147]. Note that non-predicate expressions, such as quantifiers, which strictly
speaking lack ‘instances’, are often taken to be indefinitely extensible. See Fine [5], and the other papers
in Rayo and Uzquiano [18].
8We assume that the plural quantifier ‘there are some things’ is to be read as ‘there are zero-or-more
things’.
1150
Modal Expansionism
Collapse ∀xx∃y∀u(u ≺ xx ↔ u ∈ y)
The derivation is straightforward. Informally, instantiating φ in Plural Comprehen-
sion with ‘̸∈ u’ gives us the rr , all and only those sets which are not elements of
themselves:
(1) ∀u(u ≺ rr ↔ u ̸∈ u)
Yet by Collapse, we can infer that there is an r such that:
(2) ∀u(u ≺ rr ↔ u ∈ r)
And we can use (1) and (2) to conclude:
(3) ∀u(u ∈ r ↔ u ̸∈ u)
Yet this generates a contradiction when the universal quantifier is instantiated with r
itself.
Given the elegance and power of the comprehension schema, the natural reaction
is to reject Collapse. However, it is difficult to provide a principled basis for doing
so. For instance, one might be tempted to impose a strict constraint on when plural-
ities form a set, perhaps pertaining to set-theoretic limitation of size. But as Øystein
Linnebo [14, pp. 152–154] and others have emphasised, one can appreciate the arbi-
trariness of such constraints. In an attempt to avoid such arbitrariness, an alternative
is to replace Collapse with a slightly weaker but still well-motivated principle. For
whereas Collapse states that for any things there is a set containing all those things,
a weaker principle states that for any things there could be a set containing all those
things. Yet that there merely could be but is not such a set blocks the above derivation.
This approach is characteristic of advocates of indefinite extensibility. They claim
that upon introducing the newly defined set, the set-theoretic universe expands; when
such an expansion occurs, the membership predicate comes to range over a strictly
larger set-theoretic universe. And there is something natural about this picture. For
although we saw above that the set of all sets in V which do not belong to themselves
cannot itself belong to V , it does of course belong to the power set of V—the next
rank in the hierarchy. Thus, in introducing this ‘Russell set’ and forcing an expansion
of the set-theoretic universe, the membership predicate comes to range over the more
inclusive power set of V . Moreover, one need not think of this picture in constructivist
terms. The idea is that the various set-theoretic universes are mind-independent and
pre-given. Expansion is not then to be understood in terms of universe construction,
but rather in terms of inter-linguistic semantic shift.
For another example, consider the notion of an ordinal number. Due to the Burali-
Forti paradox, it is tempting to think that ‘ordinal’ is indefinitely extensible.9 A
version of this paradox is generated by two principles:
(BF1) The ordinal corresponding to any well-ordering of ordinals is strictly larger
than any ordinal in the series.
9For a recent endorsement of this idea, see Fine [5, p. 22]. Thanks to an anonymous reviewer for empha-
sising the pertinence of this example, who also notes that the Russell quote cited above follows Russell’s
discussion of the Burali-Forti paradox.
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(BF2) Since the ordinals form a well-ordering, there is an ordinal corresponding
to it.
To appreciate the paradox, consider the ordinal specified in (BF2). By (BF1) this
ordinal, %, is strictly larger than any ordinal in the series mentioned in (BF2). How-
ever,% is then distinct from all ordinals in that series, which was meant to include all
ordinals. Nevertheless, those who claim that ‘ordinal’ is indefinitely extensible can
avoid this contradiction. On their view, in considering the series of ordinals in (BF2),
the interpretation of ‘ordinal’ expands so as to range over the ordinal corresponding
to their well-ordering itself. Thus, post-expansion we are no longer considering the
series of all ordinals after all. Similar to the set-theoretic example, this expansion
is not to be understood in terms of our constructing some new ordinal, but again in
terms of inter-linguistic semantic shift.
Strikingly, the principles (BF1) and (BF2) bear a noticeable resemblance to the
two recombinatorial principles in the modal paradox, (R1) and (R2). This suggests
that positing indefinite extensibility could be key to avoiding the recombinatorial
paradox. For example, consider again (R2), the principle which states that for all pos-
sible worlds and the elementary particles at those worlds, there is a further possibility
at which all those possible elementary particles are elementary particles. It is natu-
ral to view this further possibility as introduced by all antecedent possibilities, in a
similar sense to which % was introduced above, and to which the Russell set above
was introduced by all sets in V . Yet just as—on pain of contradiction—the Russell
set could not belong to the universe from which it was defined, this newly introduced
possibility cannot be amongst those possibilities from which it was introduced. For
by (R1) there is no possibility that contains all possible elementary particles.
The claim is that the utterance of (R2) induces an expansion of modal space; in
introducing this further possibility, one reinterprets the modal vocabulary in the lan-
guage to range over a more inclusive modal space. Therefore, this utterance of (R2) is
not true under a univocal interpretation of its modal vocabulary. Although according
to some interpretation of the metaphysical modal vocabulary all possible elementary
particles are all such that according to some more inclusive interpretation possibly
they are all elementary particles, it is not the case that according to a given interpreta-
tion possibly all possible elementary particles are all elementary particles according
to that very interpretation. Thus no contradiction results and the paradox dissolves:
the moral is that we must appreciate the disastrous consequences of attempting to
interpret the modal vocabulary in one of (R1) or (R2) according to a single modal
space.10
It is worth emphasising that if the order of the premises were changed so that we
read (R2) before (R1), we might read the modal vocabulary in (R2) univocally and
the modal vocabulary in (R1) non-univocally. On that presentation of the paradox,
10There are interesting questions about the metasemantic mechanisms by which utterances cause shifts in
interpretation which are beyond the scope of this paper. For discussion, see Studd [23, chap. 8] and Warren
[26].
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the utterance of (R1) would induce an expansion of modal space. For the utterance
of (R2) would introduce a world w such that for all possible worlds u all elemen-
tary particles at u are elementary particles at w. Yet the utterance of (R1) would then
introduce a further possibility, a world where all elementary particles at w are ele-
mentary particles and there is something distinct from every elementary particle at w
which is also a elementary particle.
Call the view under consideration modal expansionism. According to the expan-
sionist, ‘metaphysical necessity’ and its interdefinable notions are indefinitely
extensible. They maintain that the background modal space over which we modally
generalise can always be expanded, under specific contextual circumstances. More-
over, given the indefinite extensibility of ‘metaphysical necessity’, there will never
be an ultimate interpretation of metaphysical modal operators. For any modal space
over which such operators range could always be expanded via the introduction of
a new possibility. Accordingly, there is one sense in which metaphysical modality is
not the maximal member of the family of objective modalities: the objective modali-
ties can always be expanded to include broader notions of necessity.11 Nevertheless,
it is crucial to emphasise that there are multiple versions of this maximality thesis in
the expansionist setting. For instance, the expansionist can still recognise that, hold-
ing fixed the interpretation of metaphysical modal vocabulary, metaphysical modality
is the maximal objective modality according to that particular interpretation. Indeed,
the model theory given below could be generalised to handle other objective modal-
ities in a manner that would completely respect this claim. The upshot is that there
is still an important sense in which metaphysical necessity is to be equated with the
maximal objective modality.
Finally, to close this section, we note that reductionists about metaphysical modal-
ity will have to locate the indefinite extensibility in the non-modal locutions to which
they reduce metaphysical modal notions. For instance, on Lewis’ [13] concrete modal
realist reduction of metaphysical modal notions, since metaphysical modal operators
are purged from total theory in favour of first-order quantifiers over worlds, modal
expansionism collapses into indefinite extensibility about first-order quantification.12
Nevertheless, outside of the Lewisian setting, modal expansionism and expansionism
about first-order quantification are independent proposals.
3.2 Variations
In the next section, modal expansionism is developed in further detail. Before we turn
to those details, however, it will help to consider a slight variant of the recombinato-
rial paradox. The benefits of doing so are twofold. First, it will allow the reader to see
another application of the expansionist solution, which should aid their understand-
ing of how it functions. Second, it will help to clarify a potential confusion about the
expansionist solution.
11This modal claim is articulated with more care in Section 4.
12Fine [5], amongst others, defends the view that first-order quantification is indefinitely extensible.
1153
A. Roberts
The relevant variant of the recombinatorial paradox employs irreducible plural
quantification.13 In this paradox, the background plural logic is assumed to be fairly
standard, with plural quantifiers admitting an ‘empty’ plurality so as to validate the
Plural Comprehension schema discussed above. (Given that the logic is a modal
plural logic, it validates the schema in the sense that each of the schema’s instances
are true in each ‘world’ in each model.) In many respects, this variant is closer
to Fine’s original version which employs quantification over proper classes, for, as
is known from the work of Uzquiano [24] and others, such quantification can be
understood in terms of irreducible plural quantification.
Like the initial paradox, the variant paradox is based on two principles:
(Pl1) Necessarily, the elementary particles are such that possibly they are ele-
mentary particles and there is an elementary particle that is not one of
them.
(Pl2) Possibly, the elementary particles are such that necessarily, every elementary
particle is one of them.
The line of reasoning which generates the contradiction should now be familiar.
Suppose, as (Pl2) states, that it is possible that the elementary particles comprise
every possible elementary particle. Then, in contrast to (Pl1), it is not the case that
in every possibility the elementary particles are possibly elementary particles and
accompanied by another elementary particle.14
To avoid this contradiction, the expansionist claims that the utterance of (Pl2)
is not true on a univocal reading of its modal vocabulary. Similar to before, the
expansionist will view the possibility in which the elementary particles comprise all
possible elementary particles as introduced (in the above sense) from some initial
possibilities. Thus, in order to isolate this thought, the modal expansionist can specify
their non-univocal reading of this particular utterance of (Pl2):
(Pl2′) According to a given interpretation of the metaphysical modal vocabulary,
there is some more inclusive interpretation according to which it is possi-
ble that the elementary particles comprise everything which is a possible
elementary particle according to the initial interpretation.
Moreover, as with the initial recombinatorial paradox, there is an available non-
univocal reading of (Pl1) utterances too. On this reading, an utterance of (Pl1) can be
understood as follows:
(Pl1′) According to a given interpretation of the metaphysical modal vocabulary, it
is necessary that the elementary particles are such that there is some more
13See Fritz [8, Appendix B] for discussion of this version of the paradox. He notes that in the presence of
certain background model-theoretic conditions, the claims involved in the plurally formulated paradox are
model-theoretically equivalent to their corresponding claims in the initial formulation.
14As an aside, notice that this version of the paradox makes no use of the Vlach devices. Some may take
this to be an advantage, since it is at least contentious whether Vlach operators are legitimate resources
for modal primitivists to employ; see, for instance, the exchange between Melia [15] and Forbes [6].
Timothy Williamson [27, pp. 333–334] also questions whether Vlach operators can be legitimately used
by contingentists.
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inclusive interpretation according to which it is possible that they are all
elementary particles and there is an elementary particle that is not one of
them.
Thus, although this paradox differs slightly from the initial one, the expansionist
offers a similar solution to both: each paradox is to be avoided by recognising the
non-univocal readings of the relevant principles.
An interesting question concerning this variant paradox is whether it could be
avoided by rejecting Plural Comprehension. If this schema is rejected, at some
worlds there may simply be no things, the elementary particles. And, given that the
plural logic admits an ‘empty’ plurality, this is different from there being a world
at which there are the zero-many elementary particles, to which nothing belongs.
Instead, the claim would involve the radical idea that there could be an individual
elementary particle e1, an individual elementary particle e2, and so on, but no things
the elementary particles. On a natural way of treating plural definite descriptions,
this will allow (Pl2) to be trivially true, which could provide a means of avoiding the
paradox.15
Stephen Yablo [29, pp. 151–152] has advocated rejecting Plural Comprehension
as a way of capturing the indefinitely extensibility of ‘set’. On his view, this indefinite
extensibility results from a lack of determinacy in which sets there are. In turn, this
lack of determinacy falsifies the relevant instance of the comprehension schema: that
there these things, the sets. Nevertheless, regardless of whether this is viable in the
set-theoretic case, it should be uncontroversial that it is not indefinitely extensible
what elementary particles there are. As Fritz [8, p. 551–552] stresses, entities like
elementary particles simply do not exhibit the type of iterative behaviour required
for indefinite extensibility. Thus, there is no motivation to reject the instances of the
comprehension schema that are relevant to the above recombinatorial paradox.
As a minor aside, notice that Yablo’s proposal is different to the above view of the
indefinite extensibility of ‘set’ on whichCollapsewas rejected over Plural Compre-
hension. The rejection of Collapse instead of Plural Comprehension is advocated
by Linnebo [14, pp. 156–158]. However, Linnebo accepts the previously mentioned
modalised version of Collapse and rejects a suitably modalised version of Plu-
ral Comprehension. Due to this, Yablo and Linnebo’s approaches to the indefinite
extensibility of ‘set’ are very similar. It is worth noting that modal expansionism is
naturally coupled with Linnebo’s rejection of the modalised version of Plural Com-
prehension. The following section will specify an interpretation of the modality used
in these modalised principles.
This overall point highlights one crucial feature of the expansionist solution.
Specifically, it shows that the expansionist is not claiming that at each world the
domain of elementary particles is open to expansion. Again, that idea must be accom-
panied with the implausible thought that the elementary particles exhibit indefinite
extensibility. Instead, the expansionist claim is that due to the indefinite extensibil-
ity of ‘metaphysically necessary’, it is indefinitely extensible what metaphysically
15See Fritz [8, Appendix B] for the semantic details of this point. Roughly put, his gloss of ‘the elementary
particles are ψ’ is ‘for all things, if anything is one of them iff it is an elementary particle, then ψ’.
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possible elementary particles there are. This latter idea will be developed carefully
and implemented in the following section.
4 Model Theory
The expansionist conception of metaphysical modality offers an elegant solution
to the recombinatorial paradox. But how exactly should we understand the expan-
sionist’s modal claim that we can define some new possibility? Recall that such
modal talk was used to explicate the indefinite extensibility of ‘set’ too. But in the
set-theoretic case, it would have been inappropriate to read the modal claims as
expressing metaphysical modality, for it is metaphysically necessary which sets there
are. Similarly, the modal expansionist should not explicate the claim that we can
define some new metaphysical possibility in terms of metaphysical modality either.
For if, as is plausible, S4 is a lower bound on the logic of metaphysical necessity, it is
not metaphysically possible that there is some metaphysical possibility which is not
metaphysically possible. So how should this new modality be understood?
Given that expansions occur when the metaphysical modal vocabulary is reinter-
preted, a natural understanding of the new modality is as an interpretational one.16
On this view, the modality concerns possibilities for admissibly reinterpreting the
metaphysical modal vocabulary. To be possible is to be true according some such
interpretation, to be necessary is to be true according to all of them. And by an admis-
sible reinterpretation of the metaphysical modal vocabulary we mean one which
respects the postulates of metaphysical modality’s theoretical role and conforms to
the axioms of its logic.17
In order to study how interpretational and metaphysical modality interact, we can
enrich the vocabulary of our quantified modal language with a new modal operator
#≥ (letting $≥ abbreviate ¬#≥¬) expressing this particular species of interpreta-
tional necessity. We also introduce analogues (↑∗,↓∗) of the infinitely many distinct
pairs of Vlach-operators we saw previously to achieve cross-reference across reinter-
pretations. To be precise, let L2 be the language which has the exact vocabulary of
L1 plus #≥ and infinitely many distinct pairs of Vlach-operators ↑∗ and ↓∗.
To study the bimodal logic of interpretational necessity and metaphysical neces-
sity, it will help to proceed model-theoretically; this model theory need only be
treated instrumentally, since it serves the merely mathematical purpose of providing a
consequence relation for the logic. To define an appropriate class of models, we first
define a frame F as a quadruple ⟨I,R,W∗,D⟩, where I is a non-empty set under-
stood as a set of admissible interpretations of the metaphysical modal operators of a
16Uzquiano [25] adopts this understanding of the modality used to explicate indefinite extensibility in set
theory, and Studd [22, p. 706] at least entertains it. With this being said, advocates of modal approaches
to indefinite extensibility disagree on how to interpret the modality; see Fine [5] and Linnebo [14], for
alternative readings of the modal.
17For simplicity, we shall assume that the logic of metaphysical necessity is S5. In the model theory, the
definition of the accessibility relations for metaphysical necessity could be altered to validate a weaker
logic. See Salmon [20] for an argument that the logic of metaphysical necessity is weaker than S4.
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language, andR is a binary relation on I, understood as an accessibility relation over
interpretations of the metaphysical modal vocabulary. Informally, when iRj one can
think of j as an interpretation of the metaphysical modal vocabulary at least as inclu-
sive as i, in the sense that all metaphysical possibilities recognised by i, and perhaps
more, are recognised as metaphysical possibilities by j . Model-theoretically, this is
encoded byW∗, which is a total function from i ∈ I to a non-empty setW∗i , thought
of as the set of metaphysically possible worlds according to i. We then define:
W = ⋃
i ∈I
W∗i (1)
Accordingly, D is a function taking each w ∈ W , into a non-empty set Dw,
understood as that metaphysically possible world’s domain. We impose the following
conditions on frames, the reasons for which will become clear in what is to come:
Transitivity (∀i ∈ I) (∀j ∈ I) (∀l ∈ I) (iRj ∧ jRl → iRl)
Reflexivity (∀i ∈ I) (iRi)
Directedness (∀i ∈ I) (∀j ∈ I) (∀l ∈ I) (iRj∧iRl → (∃m ∈ I)(jRm∧lRm))
Monotonicity (∀i ∈ I) (∀j ∈ I) (iRj →W∗i ⊆W∗j,)
Finally, with each i ∈ I we associate an equivalence relation:
Ei = {⟨u, v⟩ : u, v ∈W∗i } ∪ {⟨u, u⟩ : u ∈W}
Each of these relations can be thought of as the accessibility relation over metaphysi-
cally possible worlds associated with that interpretation. They are each reflexive over
W in order to ensure that the logic for metaphysical necessity is S5. Note that given
Monotonicity, if iRj then Ei ⊆ Ej .
An L2 model M based on F= ⟨I,R,W∗,D⟩ is a quintuple ⟨I,R,W∗,D,V⟩,
where V is a function taking any individual constant of the language into a member
of ∪w∈WDw, and any n-place predicate letter of the language, i ∈ I, and u ∈ W ,
into a set of n-tuples of ∪w∈WDw, that predicate’s extension at that world at that
interpretation. Notice that V takes any 0-place predicate letter, i.e. an atomic sentence,
i ∈ I, and u ∈W into a set of 0-tuples; in this particular case, we think of {⟨⟩} (‘T ’)
as truth and {} (‘F ’) as falsity. V is also subject to the following constraint (where φ
is an L2 atomic formula):
Stability (∀i ∈ I)(∀w ∈W)(∀j ∈ I)(iRj → V(φ, i, w)=V(φ, j, w))
Given the below clauses for the connectives and quantifier, this condition entails that
any L2 formula which contains no occurrences of any modal operators exhibits the
same kind of stability.
An assignment g to the variables inM is a function which assigns to each indi-
vidual variable a member of ∪w∈WDw. Where x is a variable, two assignments g
and g′ are x-alternatives iff g and g′ assign the same values for all variables, except
possibly x.
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We define ‘(M, seq, i, seq,w) |=g A’ forM = ⟨I,R,W∗,D,V⟩, seq ∈ I<ω,
i ∈ I, seq ∈W<ω, w ∈W , g an assignment to the variables inM, and A a formula
of the language, recursively as follows:
(M, seq, i, seq,w) |=g Fa1... an iff ⟨Vg(a1), ...,Vg(an)⟩ ∈ V(F, i, w);
(M, seq, i, seq,w) |=g ¬A iff (M, seq, i, seq,w) ̸|=g A;
(M, seq, i, seq,w) |=g A→ B iff either (M, seq, i, seq,w) ̸|=g A
or (M, seq, i, seq,w) |=g B;
(M, seq, i, seq,w) |=g ∀xA iff (M, seq, i, seq,w) |=g′ A for every x-alternative g′
of g, such that g′(x) ∈ Dw;
(M, seq, i, seq,w) |=g "A iff for every u such that wEiu,
(M, seq, i, seq, u) |=g A
(M, seq, i, seq,w) |=g ↑n A iff (M, seq, i, seqn→w,w) |=g A;
(M, seq, i, seq,w) |=g ↓n A iff (M, seq, i, seq, seq(n)) |=g A;
(M, seq, i, seq,w) |=g #≥A iff for every j ∈ I such that iRj ,
(M, seq, j, seq,w) |=g A;
(M, seq, i, seq,w) |=g ↑∗n A iff (M, seqn→i , i, seq,w) |=g A;
(M, seq, i, seq,w) |=g ↓∗n A iff (M, seq, seq(n), seq,w) |=g A.
A formula A is true at ⟨seq, i, seq,w⟩, for seq ∈ I<ω, i ∈ I, seq ∈ W<ω, w ∈ W
iff for all variable assignments g, (M, seq, i, seq,w) |=g A. A formula A of L2 is
true in an L2 modelM = ⟨I,R,W∗,D,V⟩ iff it is true at ⟨seq, i, seq,w⟩, for every
seq ∈ I<ω, for every i ∈ I, every seq ∈ W<ω, and every w ∈ W . A formula A
of L2 is valid iff it is true in every L2 model. A set # of L2 formulas entails an L2
formula A iff for every L2 model M = ⟨I,R,W∗,D,V⟩, for every seq ∈ I<ω,
every i ∈ I, every seq ∈ W<ω, every w ∈ W and every variable assignment g, if
(M, seq, i, seq,w) |=g γ for each γ ∈ #, then (M, seq, i, seq,w) |=g A. Again,
for convenience, we shall talk of some L2 formulas (as opposed to their set) entailing
another L2 formula.
An S4.2 axiom system is sound and complete for the class of models in which the
accessibility relation is a directed partial order. Thus Transitivity, Reflexivity, and
Directedness ensure that #≥ obeys the following axiom schemas, the addition of all
instances of which to the minimal normal modal logic yields system S4.2:
(T) #≥φ → φ
(4) #≥φ → #≥#≥φ
(G) $≥#≥φ → #≥$≥φ
It is helpful to notice that the subset relation on the power set of a set is also a directed
partial order, since for any members of the power set s1, s2, s3, if s1 ⊆ s2 and s1 ⊆ s3
then there is some member s4 of the power set such that s2 ⊆ s4 and s3 ⊆ s4, namely
the union of s2 and s3. This neatly parallels the idea that the set of metaphysically
possible worlds according to an interpretation is a subset of the set of metaphysically
possible worlds according to any at least as inclusive interpretation, and thus lends
credibility to the above conditions onR. Note however that the analogy is imperfect
insofar as the subset relation on the power set of a set has a maximal element.
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Axiom schema (4) is equivalent to $≥$≥φ → $≥φ. The Transitivity condition
which validates all instances of the axiom schema thus corresponds to the thought
that in moving through interpretations of the metaphysical modal operators, no previ-
ously inadmissible meaning assignment becomes admissible. Of course, previously
admissible ones will no longer be in the range of #≥ as one moves through this pro-
cess, since they will not be at least as inclusive as the interpretation to which one has
moved, hence why the accessibility relation is not symmetric.
James Studd [22, p. 703], one advocate of a modal approach to the indefinite exten-
sibility of set-theoretic expressions, requires the following frame condition which
entails Directedness.
Connectedness (∀i ∈ I)(∀j ∈ I)(∀l ∈ I)(iRj ∧ iRl → jRl ∨ lRj)
In the current setting, this has the effect of validating all instances of the following
schema:
(D1) #≥(#≥φ → ψ) ∨#≥(#≥ψ → φ)
However, it would be too restrictive to impose Connectedness for current purposes.
To see why informally, suppose that at interpretation i there are k metaphysically pos-
sible elementary particles and k metaphysically possible spacetime points. One could
run through the initial recombinatorial puzzle with which we began to shift to an
interpretation, j , at which there arem (form>k) metaphysically possible elementary
particles and k metaphysically possible spacetime points.18 But, at i, one could also
run through a version of the initial recombinatorial puzzle in which all instances of
‘elementary particle’ are replaced with ‘spacetime point’ to shift to an interpretation,
l, at which there are m metaphysically possible spacetime points and k metaphysi-
cally possible elementary particles. But it is not the case that j is at least as inclusive
as l, or vice versa. The pair thus serves as a counterexample to Connectedness.
Imposing the Stability condition validates the following schema, where φ is a
formula of the language containing no occurrences of any modal operator:
(ST) #≥φ ∨#≥¬φ
This is desirable, since what is non-modally the case at a world should not be affected
by the expansion of metaphysical modal space. Additionally, Monotonicity has the
effect of validating a bimodal converse Barcan schema:
(BCBF) #≥"∀vφ → ∀v#≥"φ
In other terms, it has the effect of ensuring that if according to all at least as inclusive
interpretations of the metaphysical modal vocabulary it is metaphysically necessary
that everything φs, then everything is such that according to all at least as inclusive
interpretations it is metaphysically necessary that it φs. In slogan form: the possibilia
may increase, but none are left behind.
18Of course, this makes the highly plausible assumption that the broad recombinatorial reasoning
employed previously guarantees there will be a more inclusive interpretation according to which there are
additional metaphysically possible elementary particles despite there being no additional metaphysically
possible spacetime points (and vice-versa).
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It is natural to enquire about the status of other bimodal principles. One might first
wonder whether the modalities commute. The following principle is L2-valid:
(C1) #≥"φ → "#≥φ
Proof Suppose that (M, seq, i, seq,w) |= #≥"φ, and (M, seq, i, seq,w) ̸|=
"#≥φ. From the second conjunct, it follows that (M, seq, i, seq, u2) ̸|= #≥φ for
some u2 such that wEiu2. Therefore (M, seq, j, seq, u2) ̸|= φ for some j ∈ I such
that iRj . But from the first conjunct, it follows that (M, seq, l, seq,w) |= "φ for
all l ∈ I such that iRl. This includes j , so (M, seq, j, seq,w) |= "φ. It then fol-
lows that (M, seq, j, seq, u1) |= φ for all u1 such that wEju1. Yet wEju2 because
Ei ⊆ Ej and wEiu2. Contradiction.
Plausibly, this is the right result: if for any way of more liberally interpreting
metaphysical modal operators it is metaphysically necessary that φ, then it is meta-
physically necessary that for any way of more liberally interpreting metaphysical
modal operators, φ. In part, this reflects the fact that the admissible interpretations
do not change from metaphysically possible world to world when the interpretation
is held fixed. However, (C1)’s converse is not L2-valid:
(C2) "#≥φ → #≥"φ
Proof LetM be an L2 model such that:
I = {0, 1}
R = {⟨0, 1⟩, ⟨0, 0⟩, ⟨1, 1⟩}
W∗0 = {2}
W∗1 = {2, 3}
V(φ, i, w) =
{
T , ∀i ∈ I, ifφ = A,w = 2
F, otherwise
for φ an atomic sentence of L2. For atomic ‘A’, (M, seq, 0, seq, 2) |= A,
(M, seq, 1, seq, 2) |= A and (M, seq, 1, seq, 3) ̸|= A, for arbitrary seq and seq. It
is easily checked that (M, seq, 0, seq, 2) ̸|= "#≥A→ #≥"A.
For an informal counterexample to (C2), suppose that at i there is no metaphysically
possible world at which there are at least k elementary particles. Let ‘A’ be the non-
modal sentence that there are fewer than k elementary particles. At i, "#≥A, for
since ‘A’ contains no modal vocabulary the #≥ operator is redundant, yet "A since
at i it is metaphysically necessary that there are fewer than k elementary particles.
However, at i it is not the case that #≥"A. For according to some more inclusive
interpretation of the language’s metaphysical modal terms, there is a metaphysically
possible world that contains more than k elementary particles. So at i it is false that
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according to every at least as inclusive interpretation of the language’s metaphysical
modal terms there is a metaphysical modal maximum of k elementary particles.
It is straightforward to check that the principles"φ → #≥φ and#≥φ → "φ fail
too. Yet despite neither modality implying the other, certain bimodal formulae of L2
are of distinctive theoretical interest, such as those concerning which metaphysical
modal facts hold according to all interpretations. For example, as noted above, since
each Ei is an equivalence relation, at every interpretation the theorems of S5 hold
for ". Thus suitably interpretationally-modalized versions of the theorems of S5 for
" will also hold. Such formulae will concern the metaphysical modal facts whatever
the interpretation of the metaphysical modal operators, not merely the metaphysical
modal facts according to some particular interpretation.19 But note that merely pre-
fixing a#≥ operator to each theorem of S5 will not suffice to express such facts. For
the resulting formula would concern only all at least as inclusive admissible interpre-
tations of the metaphysical modal operators, and not all such interpretations. Thus we
can introduce into the language an operator # as follows, where R+ is the transitive
closure of R ∪ R−1:
(M, seq, i, seq,w) |= #A iff for each j ∈ I such that iR+j,
(M, seq, j, seq,w) |= A
R+ is an equivalence relation, so # obeys an S5 modal logic.
The # operator allows one to state absolutely general truths about metaphysical
modal facts whatever the interpretation of the metaphysical modal operators. For
example, take an instance of the S5 axiom schema:
(S51) ♦A→ "♦A
This is #-modalized as follows:
(S52) #(♦A→ "♦A)
(S52) is valid, since # conforms to the rule of necessitation (if |= φ then |= #φ),
and as previously mentioned (S51) is valid since each Ei is an equivalence relation.
Thus, at any interpretation, object-language principles prefixed with # allow us to
state absolutely general truths about the structure of metaphysical necessity at every
interpretation.
A simple, but crucial, point to notice is that the model theory allows for the
extension of a predicate such as ‘metaphysically possible elementary particle’ at a
particular metaphysically possible world to vary from interpretation to interpretation;
specifically, it may expand as one shifts to a more inclusive interpretation.20 Indeed,
we can utilise this feature to formalise an analogue of (R2*) which is true, speaks to
19Compare Uzquiano [25, p. 155] on modalisations of the axioms of set theory.
20Strictly speaking, the formal language does not contain complex predicates like ‘metaphysically possible
elementary particle’, but one can think of this point in terms of the satisfaction of open formulae.
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the concerns of not imposing arbitrariness which motivate (R2), and from which no
paradox results:21
(#R2) ↑∗1↑1 $≥ ↑∗2 ♦ ↑2↓∗1↓1 "∀x(E(x)→↓∗2↓2 E(x))
(#R2) says that according to an interpretation, there is some at least as inclu-
sive interpretation of the language such that according to the latter interpretation
it is metaphysically possible that everything which is a elementary particle at any
metaphysically possible world at the initial interpretation is a elementary particle.
Similarly, with this formal apparatus, one can now formalise an analogue of (R1*)
which is true, speaks to the concerns of not imposing arbitrariness with motivate
(R1), and from which no paradox results:
(#R1) ↑∗1 " ↑1 $≥ ↑∗2 ♦ ↑2 (↓∗1↓1 ∀x(E(x)→↓∗2↓2 E(x)) ∧
∃x(E(x)∧ ↓∗1↓1 ¬E(x)))
(#R1) says that according to an interpretation there is some at least as inclusive inter-
pretation at which it is metaphysically possible that everything which is a elementary
particle at any metaphysically possible world at the initial interpretation is a elemen-
tary particle, and there is some elementary particle which is not a elementary particle
at any metaphysically possible world at the initial interpretation.
Moreover, unlike (R1*) and (R2*), the replacement principles (#R1) and (#R2)
are satisfiable, in the sense that we can construct L2 models in which they are both
true. One class of such models are those which reflect the informal idea that at each
interpretation there is a world w which contains all possible elementary particles at
that interpretation, but at a more inclusive interpretation there is an additional world
u which contains all elementary particles atw and a elementary particle distinct from
all those at w:
LetM be an L2-model such that:
I = {x : x is an odd natural number}
R = {⟨x, y⟩ : x is less than or equal toy}
W∗i = {x < i : x is an even natural number}
Dw = {1/n : n a non-zero even natural number}(for all w ∈W)
V(φ, i, w) =
{ {1/2, ..., 1/w + 2}, whenφ = G and i > w
{}, otherwise
For ease of presentation, let us label 1/n ‘mn−2’, so that 1/2 is ‘m0’, 1/4 is ‘m2’ and
so on. We can then depict the model as follows:
21The advocate of indefinitely extensible metaphysical modality can maintain that (R2)—a sentence of
English—is implicitly interpretational modal and thus true. But since the formal quantified modal language
of which (R2*) was a formula did not contain interpretational modal operators (R2*) cannot be implicitly
interpretationally modal, and is therefore false.
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n
One can check that (#R1) and (#R2) are both true inM.
5 Revenge
One might wonder whether the modality expressed via the string of modal operators
#" can supplant metaphysical necessity in various respects. However, this issue is
not at all straightforward: if the modality #" is too similar to (our previous con-
ception of) metaphysical necessity, revenge paradoxes threaten. In this section, we
explore this issue and the various ways in which #" might differ from (our previous
conception of) metaphysical necessity.
It will help first to consider a similar recombinatorial paradox against the modality
expressed by #". Call this ‘necessity*’, and $♦ ‘possibility*’, and consider the
following argument:
(R1′) For any possible* world w, there is a possible* world u where all elementary
particles at w are elementary particles and there is something distinct from
every elementary particle at w which is also a elementary particle.
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(R2′) There is some possible* world w such that for all possible* worlds u all
elementary particles at u are elementary particles at w.
Yet considering w in (R2′), from (R1′) we can infer that:
(C′) There is a possible* world uwhere all elementary particles atw are elementary
particles and there is also a elementary particle who is not identical with any
of them.
But all the elementary particles at w are all the elementary particles at all possible*
worlds. Contradiction. Is this argument sound?
(R1′) is licensed by the modal expansionist solution to the initial recombinatorial
paradox. For according to any interpretation there is some more inclusive interpre-
tation according to which for every metaphysically possible world w at the previous
interpretation, there is a metaphysically possible world at which every elementary
particle at w is a elementary particle and there is a elementary particle distinct from
any elementary particle at w.
However, why believe (R2′)? That is, why believe that at an interpretation there is
some metaphysically possible world at which all possible* elementary particles—all
elementary particles at any metaphysically possible world at any interpretation—
are elementary particles? This claim seems antithetical to modal expansionism. For
modal expansionists maintain that given any metaphysical modal space one can shift
the interpretation to a more inclusive space which contains additional metaphys-
ical possibilities. Such possibilities will include the possibility of there being all
possible elementary particles in the initial modal space accompanied by an extra ele-
mentary particle. Yet if (R2′) were true, then at some interpretation i, it would be
metaphysically possible that all possible* elementary particles—that is, all metaphys-
ically possible elementary particles according to all interpretations—are elementary
particles. But the modal expansionist’s point throughout has been that at an interpre-
tation i not everything which is a metaphysically possible φ according to some more
inclusive interpretation is a metaphysically possible φ at i.
The crucial point is that one should not expect the recombinatorial principles
which govern metaphysical modality to have #" analogues. In particular, and in
contrast to metaphysical modality, the expansionist has introduced nothing to the the-
oretical role of #" which licenses the thought that one should be able to collect
all #"-possibilities of a certain kind into a single #"-possibility. Compare indefi-
nite extensibility in the set-theoretic case: there is no interpretation of set-theoretic
vocabulary according to which every interpretationally possible set is a set.
Nevertheless, this is a negotiable decision point. If one is concerned that the modal
expansionist is guilty of imposing arbitrariness onto #"-modal space as result of
rejecting (R2′), one can respond more concessively. For one might be tempted to
claim that the modality expressed by#", necessity*, is itself indefinitely extensible.
Expansionists of this disposition could extend their treatment of the initial paradox
to the revenge version. Of course, this thesis of indefinite extensibility would too
have to be explicated modally in terms of a different interpretational modality #2
(we relabel the original # as #1). And similar revenge paradoxes would threaten the
modality expressed by #2#1". Thus the expansionist would have to iterate the idea
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that interpretational modalities are indefinitely extensible. Any paradox involving
the modality expressed by #n,#n−1, ...,#1" would be handled by a introducing a
new interpretational modality #n+1. Moreover, on natural ways of developing this
proposal, further modalities would have to be introduced at limit states in a typical
way: #ωφ ↔ ∧n<ω#nφ. In turn, these limit modalities would generate further
iterations and other limit modalities. However, since it is plausible that ‘ordinal’ is
itself indefinitely extensible, there will be no modality expressed by #αφ, for every
interpretationally possible ordinal α.22
On the resultant view, for any interpretation i of#" there will be somemore inclu-
sive interpretation j of #" such that the modality expressed by #" at i is strictly
less inclusive than the modality expressed by #" at j . It is important to empha-
sise the costs of this response. If the indefinite extensibility of modality is iterated
as such, one must forfeit absolute metaphysical modal generality. But if the choice
is between imposing arbitrariness on metaphysical modal space and recognising our
own expressive limitations, perhaps humility seems preferable to imposition.
6 Further Application
Modal expansionism enjoys further benefits. The literature on metaphysical modality
contains a wealth of other recombinatorial puzzles and paradoxes which are typically
presented as attacks on the notion of metaphysical necessity, or some particular the-
ory thereof. Unlike the recombinatorial paradox considered above, these arguments
employ auxiliary machinery such as certain set-theoretic principles or certain con-
ceptions of propositions. In response to these other puzzles and paradoxes, typically
philosophers have suggested modifying the auxiliary machinery which they employ.
However, these responses are parochial and fail to provide a solution which gener-
alises to other modal recombinatorial paradoxes. In contrast, a benefit of the modal
expansionist solution is that it can offer a unified solution to all such paradoxes. This
greater generality further motivates the modal expansionist view.
In this section, we shall consider two well-known recombinatorial paradoxes:
David Kaplan’s [11] ‘Kaplan’s paradox’, and argument due to Daniel Nolan [16]
which was later developed by Ted Sider [21].23 We shall see how modal expansion-
ist treats each paradox, and, along the way, consider how the expansionist approach
compares to some other extant solutions. The discussion will highlight aspects of the
expansionist approach which may have gone unnoticed.
6.1 Kaplan’s Paradox
Kaplan’s paradox runs as follows. Suppose the set of metaphysically possible worlds
is of cardinality k. According to coarse-grained views of propositions that individ-
uate propositions by a criterion of necessary equivalence, each subset of this set is
22This final use of ‘interpretational possibility’ should be understood as invoking the Studd-Linnebo
interpretational modality used to explicate the indefinite extensibility of ‘set’.
23Kaplan [11, p. 41, f.n.1] remarks that he first presented the paradox during the 1970s.
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the proposition true at all and only the metaphysically possible worlds belonging to
that subset. Hence by the power set operation, there are 2k propositions. But con-
sider a person and a time. For any proposition, it is metaphysically possible that it is
entertained as the only content that person entertains at that time. Call this a propo-
sition’s being queried. There are therefore distinct metaphysically possible worlds
corresponding to the occurrence of each query. It follows that there are at least 2k
worlds. Contradiction.
Several solutions to the paradox have been offered. Kaplan [11] himself takes the
paradox to demonstrate that we ought to adopt a ramified conception of proposi-
tions (and spaces of worlds), and David Lewis [13, pp. 107–108] draws the moral
that some propositions are not in principle entertainable as mental contents. But, as
emphasised previously, whatever the merits of such solutions, they lack generality.
Clearly, Kaplan’s paradox invokes a recombinatorial principle: the premise that for
any proposition determined by a metaphysical modal space there is a metaphysically
possible world in that space where that proposition is uniquely entertained. Yet given
the alleged paradoxes to which similar recombinatorial premises give rise, it would
be sensible to expect this particular principle to do so too.
Indeed, the modal expansionist blames the recombinatorial principle and not the
particular theory of propositions or mental content. After all, there would appear to
be little reason to complicate one’s theory of propositions or mental content if one
already recognises the tendency of recombinatorial principles to induce expansion.
Thus, the expansionist will offer their familiar diagnosis of the paradox. On their
view, the recombinatorial principle about the querying of the propositions which a
metaphysical modal space determines is only true when its modal vocabulary is read
non-univocally. The true reading in question is as follows:
(KP) According to some interpretation, for any proposition determined by the
metaphysical modal space at that interpretation, there is some more inclusive
interpretation according to which there is a metaphysically possible world
where that proposition is uniquely entertained (i.e. queried).
Thus, given some metaphysical modal space of cardinality k, there is some more
inclusive metaphysical modal space of cardinality 2k at which all propositions
determined by the previous metaphysical modal space are metaphysically possibly
queried. Yet no contradiction results from this.
At this point, will be fruitful to compare the expansionist approach to Kaplan’s
ramificational response to the paradox. Although, as mentioned above, Kaplan’s
approach is less general than expansionism, it raises some interesting aspects of
expansionism which previously may not have been salient.
The basic idea behind Kaplan’s ramificational approach is that the space of pos-
sibilities is partitioned into levels indexed by the natural numbers, and this partition
induces a further partition on the space of propositions. As Kaplan [11, p. 45]
evocatively describes it:
At level 0, there [are] only the possibilities of, say, different distributions of
earth, air, fire, and water. Now [at level 1] there are different distributions of
earth, air, fire, and water with it being queried whether all is earth, and there
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are the same distributions with it not being queried whether all is earth. These
new possibilities provide new propositions to query—for example, whether it
is queried whether it is queried whether all is earth.
On Kaplan’s view, then, a level n space of possibilities generates a corresponding
level n space of propositions, propositions about level n possibilities. Then, those
level n propositions can be queried at level n + 1 possibilities. Thus, no level n
proposition is ever queried at a level n possibility, which allows one to resist the
reasoning in Kaplan’s paradox.
Clearly, the ramificational approach is similar to expansionist approach. Advo-
cates of the former partition the space of possibilities into successively more inclusive
levels, and advocates of the latter claim that any space of possibilities can be
expanded to a more inclusive space. More generally, although the exact relation
between ramification and indefinite extensibility is vexed, it is natural to view the
former as something of a precursor to the latter. (This point is not confined to
their applications to metaphysical modality.) However, one must appreciate that—
as described by Kaplan—the ramificational approach does not have the capacity to
solve the initial recombinatorial puzzle of the elementary particles. For, presumably,
matters concerning elementary particles are matters of earth, air, fire, and water, so
to speak. And, as Kaplan himself emphasises, no possibilities only about new dis-
tributions of earth, air, fire, and water are introduced at level 1. Instead, at level 1,
there are the same distributions of earth, air, fire, and water along with various level
0 propositions being either queried or not queried.
With this being said, Kaplan’s discussion of the ramificational approach raises an
interesting issue for expansionists. For given the similarity of both approaches, one
might expect that modal expansionism is naturally coupled with an expansionist con-
ception of propositions, similar to how ramifying the space of possibilities induced a
ramification of propositions.24 Indeed, if propositions are identified by a criterion of
metaphysically necessary equivalence, an expansionist conception of propositions is
simply a corollary of modal expansionism. Whether this is borne out on alternative
conceptions of propositions deserves further discussion, although here it would take
us too far afield.
6.2 Lewis &Williamson
Building on Daniel Nolan’s [16] work, Ted Sider [21] has argued that both David
Lewis’ concrete modal realism and Timothy Williamson’s first-order necessitism are
incompatible with the Urelement Set Axiom. Once again, a recombinatorial principle
features centrally in each respective argument:
Moderate Plenitude For each cardinal number v, it is metaphysically possible that
there exist v non-sets.
24Yu [30] discusses what is naturally classified as an expansionist conception of propositions.
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Assuming concrete modal realism,Moderate Plenitude entails that there cannot be
a set of all non-sets, thus violating the Urelement Set Axiom. For suppose that there
were a set S of all non-sets. Let its cardinality be k. Let v be some cardinal number
larger than k. ByModerate Plenitude it is metaphysically possible that there exist v
non-sets. Thus by Lewis’ concrete modal realism there is a metaphysically possible
world containing v non-sets, all of which are members of S. So S’s cardinality is not
k. Contradiction.
Similarly, first-order necessitism entails that there cannot be a set of all non-sets,
again in violation of the Urelement Set Axiom. For suppose that there were a set S
of all non-sets. Let its cardinality be k. Let v be some cardinal number larger than
k. By Moderate Plenitude it is metaphysically possible that there exist v non-sets.
Since the first-order necessitist holds that everything which metaphysically possibly
is something is actually something, byModerate Plenitude there are actually v non-
sets, all of which are members of S. (This of course assumes that metaphysically
possible non-sets are necessarily as such, if they exist.) So S’s cardinality is not k.
Contradiction.
It may be helpful to notice that Lewisian concrete modal realists are naturally cat-
egorised as first-order necessitists.25 For when the quantifiers are read unrestrictedly,
the Lewisian concrete modal realist will endorse the necessitist claim that necessarily
everything is necessarily something. Moreover, the above recombinatorial arguments
exploit the fact that both Lewisians and Williamson subscribe to this necessitist prin-
ciple. Seen from this perspective, the argument is a direct objection to first-order
necessitism.
Is is tempting to conclude that the objection shows that first-order necessitists must
reject the Urelement Set Axiom, and perhaps the iterative conception of set which
some take to motivate the axiom.26 But in an expansionist setting, necessitists need
not reject the set-theoretic principle. As one would anticipate, the expansionist rejects
Moderate Plenitude but endorses a nearby, qualified principle:
Moderate Plenitude* For each cardinal number v, according to some at least
as inclusive interpretation it is metaphysically possible that
there exist v non-sets.
This replacement principle speaks to whatever theoretical considerations initially
led one to endorse Moderate Plenitude, and is compatible with the Urelement Set
Axiom on both Lewis’ concrete modal realism and Williamson’s first-order neces-
sitism. The moral is that when coupled with expansionism, the first-order necessitist
is not committed to rejecting any principles of set theory by the recombinatorial
argument.
To close, this final discussion suggests a broader project of integrating modal
expansionismwith a view on which ‘set’ is itself indefinitely extensible. Such an inte-
grated view may have the potential to handle the modal set-theoretic recombinatorial
25See, for instance, Williamson [27, p. 17] and Divers [2] on this point.
26See Sider [21, p. 256] in particular for this latter point.
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paradoxes discussed in Hawthorne and Uzquiano [10], although this investigation
must be left for future work.
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